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This article explores the extent to which national political conditions shape domestic engagement with transnational sustainability initiatives; those initiatives aiming to regulate social and environmental aspects of commodity production, processing, exchange and consumption (Ponte and Cheyns, 2013, p. 2). In doing so, the article reconciles three aspects rarely examined in conjunction in transnational governance studies: the transnational diffusion of norms, the participation pattern of country-specific actors, and the domestic political context of developing economies. By connecting transnational norm-diffusion with domestic politics, this article tackles two deficits in the literature. First, the article narrows an empirical gap where little is yet known regarding the manner in which specific domestic structures in developing economies ‘frustrate, amplify, or reconfigure transnational business governance’ (Bartley, 2014, p. 95). Second, it challenges conventional theoretical accounts where governance tends to be approached from the perspective of norm-setting and norm-setters, sidelining institutions, discourses, and actors at play on the receiving side of transnational regulation. 
Challenging mainstream rationalist and constructivist explanations, where the primacy of Northern markets, norms, and actors ‘pulls’ the global South to converge with Northern regulatory frameworks and practices (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007; Braithwaite, 2006; Vogel, 2010), this article tackles the question regarding the conditions that facilitate the lasting uptake and effectiveness of private regulatory initiatives in a developing economy. It does so by analyzing the case of private sustainability governance in Argentina. This country has been noted to be ‘less receptive’ to private governance initiatives than other comparable economies in the region, in particular Brazil, its main trading partner, but increasingly in relation to other countries such as Colombia, as it is later explained (Espach, 2009). 
Conventional explanations in the literature indicate the level of export dependence of specific industries and/or their position in global supply chains, as well as the presence of episodes of public controversy and international mobilization, to account for the level of development of regulatory standards and the adoption of new organizational practices by firms in specific locations (Bartley, 2010, p. 4). I claim that neither of these conditions adequately explains the Argentine case. Rather, in line with the ‘turn to politics’ approach recently supported by a number of scholars of transnational governance, this article poses that the key explanatory variables reside at the domestic level (Dubash and Morgan, 2012; Ebeling and Yasué, 2009; Nadvi, 2014; Neilson and Pritchard, 2010; Ponte, 2008). Specifically, the article extends the conclusions by Espach (2006, 2009) and Bartley (2010) concerning national factors affecting the diffusion and uptake of private regulation. Studying private environmental regimes in Argentina and Brazil, Espach concluded that effectiveness upon implementation was conditioned primarily by demand-side organizational capacity, in turn a synthesis of industrial policy legacies, sectoral business culture, and the presence of civil society and corporate coalitions supporting regulatory innovation. Paying greater attention to the indirect role of the state, Bartley (2010) considered that regulatory uptake responded significantly to features in an industry’s domestic political economy, in regards to state-business relations, the clarity and legitimacy of property rights, and the manner in which political regimes at particular times ‘channel domestic coalitions towards public and private arenas of rule-making’ (p. 26-27).  
This article broadens these conclusions by moving beyond the institutionalized domain and the structure of particular industries and sectors, and incorporating the effect of non- and semi-institutionalized ideational and discursive dimensions over the disposition of primary and secondary social actors. Consequently, I consider that state-business relations, corporate culture, and societal perceptions are reflective of complex and often enduring political, ideological, and cultural traits and political discourses that may transcend the domain of a given industry or the specifics of a regulatory initiative. In absence of a better term, and to emphasize the persistence of these traits and discourses over time and their transversal social impact, I refer to them under the term ‘national political culture’. I acknowledge this to be a polemic concept in comparative political science, given its early static use to characterize (apparent) political predispositions in societies (Inglehart, 1988). Nonetheless, this static conception has been challenged by more sociological approaches, where culture is understood as a relational structure – comprising legal doctrines, political and civil societies, and symbolic systems of moral opinion – organizing social life and the economy at a particular point in time (Somers, 1995). This article aligns with this second understanding, considering political culture dynamic but conditioned by path dependent trajectories that provide continuity over time. Accordingly, I understand national political culture as the set of symbols, meanings, and styles of acting that organize political claim-making and opinion-forming within a given national community during a particular period (Lichterman and Cefai, 2006). This includes the effect of governmental agendas and discourses, which borrow from and aspire to shape political culture, as well social perceptions and public opinion. 
On this definition, I pose that certain aspects of Argentina’s political culture over the last decade – the nationalist and corporatist framing of state-society relations under the Kirchner governments (2003-2015), societal indifference towards environmental issues, and a lingering anti-corporate stance in public opinion – have undermined the validity, relevance, and centrality of private sustainability initiatives and standards. Moreover, I consider that these political cultural aspects explain (and reproduce) a general pattern of engagement by Argentine actors that is fragmented and confrontational, limiting the uptake and regulatory effectiveness of private sustainability governance in the country. 
To probe the plausibility of this argument the article offers a constructivist framework where inasmuch as sustainability governance involves the creation of new social categories and practices, and aspires to mobilize actors around them, it can be analyzed through the notion of ‘framing’ as used in social movement studies (Benford and Snow, 2000). By elaborating the concept of ‘frame resonance’, the article shifts focus from the strategic activities of norm-setters and entrepreneurs, to the situated cultural, ideological, and historical institutions that provide (or deprive) a given regulatory proposal with meaning and mobilizing potency. 
This framework supports an inferential argument that synthesizes findings from both previous investigations and extensive secondary sources. In previous investigations, I mapped the participation of Argentine and Brazilian actors during the 2000s in three sustainability governance initiatives: the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and the ISO 26000:2010 Guidance Standard on Social Responsibility Working Group (ISO SR). This research included fieldwork in both countries and the analysis of varied primary sources such as institutional reports, meetings’ minutes, organizational websites, articles in the media, and publicly available statistics. Simultaneously, in light of the article’s culturalist approach, I rely on secondary material to support and complement punctual observations and comments by interviewees pertaining sustainability regulation, and highlight recurrent political-cultural dimensions noticed by other researchers.
The article is divided into four sections plus a conclusion. The first section discusses the Argentine case and evaluates alternative explanations. The second outlines the proposed analytical framework. The third presents a general map of Argentine participation in contemporary sustainability initiatives. The fourth and main section discusses this participation profile against three aspects of Argentine political culture affecting the relevance of sustainability programs. 

1.	The Argentine Case in Perspective

The case of Argentina is interesting as its behavior in relation to sustainability governance does not fit the expectations of conventional models relying on the diffusion dynamics of international trade and/or penetration by foreign firms and advocacy actors. This becomes more evident when contrasting the Argentine situation against the one in Brazil. This comparison facilitates controlling for macro-level variables that distinguish the two largest economies in South America from other economies in the region: both countries have similar levels of industrialization and development, experienced similar political economic trajectories (democratization and economic liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, and a turn towards neo-developmental regimes in the 2000s), are primary commodity exporters (soybeans derivatives and corn for Argentina, iron ore, oil, and soybeans for Brazil), and are commercially interrelated: both are members of Mercosur, with 30% of Argentine exports going to Brazil and 10% of Brazil’s going to Argentina (Comtrade, 2014). Accordingly, trade models pose that developing economies with greater exposure to sophisticated market destinations and greater integration with buyer-driven supply chains, should display more prominent forms of governance at the point of production. Consequently, Argentina should have a similar or higher level of involvement with sustainability governance than Brazil: both countries export similar amounts to OECD markets (53% Argentina, 59% Brazil in 2012) but Brazil destines a greater proportion to China (26% Brazil, 11% Argentina), a less demanding destination regarding socio-environmental standards (Comtrade, 2014). Moreover, Argentina has a greater exposure to foreign corporate influence: its economy is more export-dependent (with an exports-to-GDP ratio of 17% against 9% for Brazil) (Ferchen et al., 2013), and has a greater presence of foreign TNCs (65% of Argentina’ top 500 firms are foreign, compared to 40% in Brazil) (Kormann, 2015; Schorr and Wainer, 2014). 




However, though a comprehensive analysis of regional differences exceeds the possibilities of this article,​[2]​ more in-depth analyses reveal a number of anomalies in the Argentine situation not accounted for by market-led considerations. First, Argentine participation is slowing down relative to other countries. For instance, the rate of firm subscription to the UNGC is falling, with an average of 36 firms/year in 2007-2010 dropping to 24 firms/year in 2011-2014 (while remaining constant around 78 firms/year in Brazil). Additionally, as table 1 indicates, in the last few years Argentina has been surpassed by Colombia, the third South American economy, in terms of UNGC membership, ISO 14001 certificates, and GRI reporting firms. Second, considering that the number of standard users serves as a general indication of regime participation, more qualitative studies have noted substantial differences between Argentina and Brazil; with Brazil displaying an active and institutionalized pattern of involvement in private regimes not observable in Argentina (Espach, 2006, 2009; Peña and Davies, 2014). These differences are confirmed by the analysis in section 3. 
Hence, ascribing limits to transnational explanations, Espach (2009, 89) accounted for different levels of regime effectiveness by pointing to the legacy of severe legitimacy crisis and governmental ineffectiveness in Brazil shaping positive perceptions of private regulation and a more collaborative environment across business and civil society. While I share his overall conclusion that regime effectiveness is substantially dependent on the capacities, interests and coordination of local actors configuring organizational capacity, I consider that Espach overlooks the role of broader ideational structures and ideological links. As a result, he ends up attributing too much weight to the effect of legitimacy crises in generating awareness and mobilizing support, while sidelining the effect of less institutionalized aspects of state-society relations.​[3]​ Subsequently, it remains unclear why certain issues continue to be less urgent in Argentina than Brazil, or generate different societal responses. After all, deforestation has advanced significantly in Argentina over the last decades in light of recognized governmental ineffectiveness (Leguizamón, 2014), and the country has experienced major human rights and socio-economic turmoil, but this has not increase environmental awareness or turned Argentine actors towards private governance. Moreover, as section 4 explains, references to crisis episodes can serve as well to reinforce adversarial positions. 




The application of social movement ideas to the study of private governance is recent, tentatively explored in King (2008) and further developed in Dobusch and Quack (2013, p.59). The latter posed that transnational regulation can be treated as a process of collective mobilization where ‘just as social movements try to activate a large number of individuals to their cause, mobilization for standards seeks its adoption and acceptance by large groups of individuals’. However, while these authors focused on the strategic mobilizing strategies that standard-setters use to gain support, this article relies on Framing Theory to incorporate national culture, ideologies, and political discourses into transnational norm diffusion. 
The proponents of Framing Theory, David Snow and Robert Benford (2000, p. 58), considered succesful framing to involve ‘among other things, the articulation and accenting or amplification of elements of existing beliefs and values, most of which are associated with existing ideologies’. In order to mobilize action, norm-promoting actors have to ‘offer interpretative frames that connect with the self-conceptions, values, or moral and cultural sensitivities of potential adherents’ (Walder, 2009, p. 406). Subsequently, the theory poses that the activities of norm-entrepreneurs involve a combination of ‘frame alignment processes’, aimed at reconciling new mobilizing proposals with the pre-existing cultural, ideological, and symbolic material possessed by target audiences (Benford and Snow, 2000, pp. 624–625).​[4]​ 
Hence, for a frame to acquire mobilizing potency, it thus needs to display ‘resonance’. Resonance results from two interacting factors: (i) the credibility of the proposed frame, and (ii) its relative salience (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 619). The first element concerns with the legitimacy and authority of frame proponents, the consistency between the claims, beliefs and actions of mobilizing actors, the credibility of claim-makers, and the empirical validity of particular claims. In governance terminology, this refers to supply-side institutions, and instances of what constructivists denominate ‘input’ and ‘throughput’ legitimacy (Hahn and Weidtmann, 2012). Salience, instead, refers to the cultural, political, and ideological conditions shaping the experiential commensurability, centrality, and narrative fidelity of an incoming frame. Therefore, salience links with features on the demand side of governance: commensurability points to the audience’s awareness for the issues punctuated as problematic or unjust, and their congruence with their everyday experiences; centrality to how essential the beliefs and ideas associated with the frame are to the lives of the target audience, and fidelity to the relative alignment of the frame with extant beliefs, ideologies, and myths (Snow and Benford, 1992, p. 140). 
The primary hypothesis of Framing Theory that underpins this article is that the greater the misalignment between (supply-side) credibility conditions and (demand-side) salience dimensions, the more problematic and limited audience mobilization can expected to be (Benford and Snow, 2000, p. 622). Moreover, while the prevalent stance in most social movement (and private governance) analyses is that frame-makers ‘face cultural challenges that, like a deficit of funding or a repressive political context, can be overcome’ (Polletta, 2008, p. 83), this conceptual model allows for the less explored possibility that ‘certain ideas are likely to be structurally disadvantaged by the terms of the dominant discourse’ (Ferree, 2003, p. 305). Consequently, diverging political cultures, ideologies, strategic interests, and organizational experiences at the point of reception can interfere with the salience of an incoming frame and with framing attempts made by norm-promoting actors by reinforcing antagonistic positions by domestic challengers and opponents (Resnick, 2009, p. 58).​[5]​ 
At the same time, Framing Theory broadens the range of factors involved in norm-diffusion, as certain frames have the potential to expand their scope and influence to a point that they color and constraint the orientation and activities of actors beyond their primary audience and concerns (Snow and Benford, 1992, pp. 139–141). The (semantic) reach and flexibility of a frame determines the extension of a ‘discursive field’, the symbolic terrain where discussions, decisions, and actions take place. This notion extends the institutional and actor-centered concept of organizational field (Dingwerth and Pattberg, 2009) to include both cultural materials of potential relevance (i.e. beliefs, values, ideologies, myths, and narratives), and a wider set of actors ‘whose interests are aligned, albeit differentially, with the contested issues or events, and who thus have a stake in what is done or not done about those issues and events’ (Snow, 2004, p. 402). On this basis, frame resonance becomes the outcome of a process of articulation and elaboration among interactants in a dynamic discursive field, where social actors go about making sense of the issues they are confronted with by drawing from the available semantic tools (Polletta, 2008, p. 89).  
I pose that this interpretivist framework enhances the turn-to-politics approach in private governance studies by granting greater explanatory weight to domestic variables, social institutions, and cultural-political discourses. The resonance of a particular regulatory initiative can be considered the product of the semantic ‘fit’ between a given ‘governance frame’ and the national cultural material (and domestic frames) from where situated actors draw to interpret it. The more seamless this fit, the higher the degree of salience a governance initiative can be expected to have, and the higher the chances of mobilizing domestic support (Bernstein and Cashore, 2007, p. 355). Simultaneously, the regulatory reach of a given governance agenda potentially configures discursive fields of different extension, and thus, different types of resonance. This accommodates the legitimacy-effectiveness trade off observed in transnational regulatory projects, where the more general the norm, the more extensive the discursive field, the more convoluted the politics of resonance, the higher the chances for the norm to be challenged (Bernstein, 2004). Thus, a given regulatory initiative can have high resonance among a narrow set of regime members, such as firms and experts in a specific target industry, but lack salience for the rest of society. This is evident in the case of highly technical norms, such as internet protocols and banking regulations, where resonance is grounded on techno-scientific knowledge and epistemic communities (Loya and Boli, 1999). 
Nonetheless, in less technical domains, resonance is expected to suffer from competing systems of meaning configuring alternative values, normative references, and organizational preferences. This openness presents a challenge for the effectiveness of private ‘social’ regimes, such as sustainability, CSR, and socio-environmental standards, which operate in a discursive field crossed by contextual and disputed cultural and political economic vectors, which in turn interpellate a wider range of actors across society. In this regard, Espach (2009, p. 71) noted that a critical moment in the domestic evolution of private governance is when secondary participants, neither committed to nor opposed to investing in superior standards and certification, ‘decide to participate because they are convinced that doing so is worth the costs and effort’. This participation refers to actors and circumstances that may not be part of an organizational field, but do integrate a related discursive field. For example, a regulatory initiative can be effective in driving participation in a small group of firms seeking reputational gains, but lack overall validity or commensurability for eventual civil society allies, which may perceive these actions as a sham, as illegitimate, or as unimportant. In this manner, salience constitutes a major condition behind organizational capacity and the emergence of supporting cross-sectoral coalitions, which in turn partially determine regime effectiveness. 
Relying on this framework, in the fourth section I examine how over the last decade specific aspects of Argentine political culture have interfered with components of the sustainability agenda in areas of industrial relations, human rights, environment and private collaboration, configuring a discursive field that negatively affected the salience of private governance initiatives. 


3.	Mapping Participation in Argentina

The study of resonance poses a methodological challenge noted by social movement scholars: while framing strategies, standard-setting negotiations, and bargaining activities are empirically-observable, the effect of culture and ideology in meaning construction is an abstract process that needs to be inferred analytically (Snow and Benford, 2000, p. 59). Considering this, I unpack the resonance of sustainability initiatives in Argentina through an inferential analysis combining three pieces of data: (i) the qualitative involvement of Argentine actors in the organizational structures of global sustainability initiatives, (ii) comparison against the Brazilian situation, and (iii) the positioning and perceptions of primary and secondary actors regarding sustainability governance norms and programs. While (i) and (ii) are elaborated ahead, (iii) is presented in the next section, as part of the discussion of the effects of national political culture. 




Third, the three initiatives claim to represent an international consensus on sustainability governance. Their organizational structures purposely incorporate multi-stakeholder representative mechanisms that combine regional, national, and functional constituencies, which were used to trace actor participation. Lastly, none of the initiatives is certifiable (with ISO lacking even subscription statistics for ISO 26000), providing guidelines rather than formal requirements. This feature is expected to minimize ‘California Effect’-type dynamics in favor of norm-driven participation (Vogel, 2008). 
My analysis reveals that by the early 2010s Argentine actors displayed a fragmented pattern of engagement with the formal structures of global initiatives suggestive of low resonance, with few relevant firms and civil society actors involved, few participants engaged in more than one initiative, scarce cross-sectoral collaboration, and limited links with international actors. This participation profile is transversal to all social sectors. On the one end, there is almost a total absence of labor or state actors formally engaged with the global initiatives. Argentine trade unions were not involved with either the UNGC or the GRI, and even in the case of the ISO SR, where national expert delegations included a labor representative, participation in official meetings was sporadic. A trade union official, belonging to the CGT, the principal and powerful Argentine trade union federation, attended the first ISO WG Plenary Meeting that took place in Brazil in 2005, but was largely absent from all remaining events. Similarly, no state representative has been involved in the standard-setting structures of the UNGC and the GRI until 2014.​[7]​ The government expert attending the ISO working group did not belong to a governmental agency or ministry, but was the head of the ‘Quality and Modernization Centre’ (FAM/CECAM), a small private consultancy implementing and monitoring quality standards in Argentine municipalities. This contrasts with the Brazilian situation, where the ABNT, the Brazilian national normalization agency, chaired the entire ISO SR working group between 2005 and 2010, representatives of the Ministry of Environment and the Secretary of Human Rights have been governmental advisors to the GRI, a representative of one of the largest trade union confederations in Brazil, Força Sindical, was a GRI’s stakeholder council member for a decade, and former President Da Silva gave the opening speech in the 2004 Global Compact Leaders Summit.
 Involvement by Argentine business and civil society actors is indeed more numerous, but coordinating roles appear assigned to secondary organizations with limited capacity and influence. No major Argentine NGO has been directly involved in any of the three sustainability initiatives. For example, in 2012 the two NGOs participating in the Committee leading the UNGC national network were the Institute of Ethics and Quality in Agriculture (EticAgro), and the Argentine Society for Equity in Health (SAES). EticAgro is an organization created in 2005 focused on promoting ‘responsible’ agricultural practices by delivering seminars and training courses in collaboration with a number of universities. SAES is a small entity linking medics around issues of health equity and distributive justice (lacking a formal website). In 2014, these organizations were replaced by two other organizations of marginal visibility: the Rotary Club of Boulogne Sur Mer (a Buenos Aires suburb), and the Economics Association of Buenos Aires City. Similar low-profile actors are found among civil society participants in ISO SR. The civil society expert that attended ISO 26000 Plenary Meetings belonged to very small organization called Fundación El Otro, focused on national development and CSR programs. Notably, a local civil society scholar dismissed this organization as irrelevant, suggesting the possibility that their involvement in ISO SR was likely an opportunistic strategy to access corporate funding (San Andrés University, 2011, pers. comm., 14 September). Indeed, their website has not been updated since 2010 (when the ISO SR concluded), and their attendance to ISO meetings was financed by Red Puentes, a Latin America-wide sustainability advocacy network in turn supported by the Dutch development agency (SOMO, 2011, pers. comm., 15 May). In the case of GRI, two NGOs were directly involved in its governance structure: the Centre for Human Rights and Environment (CEDHA), and the Argentine Institute of CSR (IARSE). While the activities of IARSE regarding the GRI are limited to diffusion and training activities in the central region of the Argentina, CEHDA constitutes an exception, being the only Argentine NGO in the sustainability network with an active international stance, participating in both the GRI’s Technical Advisory Committee and its Stakeholder Council, and involved in projects with the World Bank and the International Financial Corporation (IFC). Moreover, CEHDA’s co-founder, Romina Picolotti, was Minister of Environment between 2006 and 2008. 
The situation of business is similar, with no major Argentine firm or business federation having a relevant presence in the global initiatives’ multi-stakeholder structures. A number of firms have repeatedly participated in the Directive Committee of the Argentine UNGC network. By 2014 this included the state-owned oil company YPF, the large Argentine-Italian industrial holding Techint, the confectionery producer Arcor, the agribusiness Los Grobo Group, plus a myriad of TNC’s subsidiaries such as Telefonica, Petrobras, Unilever, and Carrefour, and a few SMEs. Notwithstanding, coordinating roles had been delegated to proxy organizations with low organizational capacity and limited representative character, suggesting little interest by Argentine business for directly engaging with these projects.​[8]​ Hence, the representation of the Argentine UNGC network has been shared between an executive of the Argentine Institute of Oil and Gas (IAPG), a small think tank supported by oil companies in the country, and the country officer of the UNDP.​[9]​ The business expert attending the Argentine ISO SR delegation, also involved in the UNGC national network, was the Director of CEADS (Argentine Business Council for Sustainable Development),​[10]​ an entity supported by a club of large firms, both of domestic and foreign capital. CEADS is also an organization with a permanent staff of a handful of individuals, very limited resources, and minimal public exposure. An interview with a CEADS’ representative indicated that its organizational activities circumscribe to systematize and communicate the experiences of its member companies regarding environmental and community projects, and report on some global trends (CEADS, 2011, pers. comm., 7 September).​[11]​ The other organization linked with two of the three initiatives is AG Sustentable, both a member of the UNGC national network and a GRI Organizational Stakeholder. As with the previous cases, AG Sustentable is a (very) small consultancy offering social reporting services. Sustainability reporting is a practice that large firms in the country have only embraced in the last few years: only six Argentine companies used GRI guidelines by 2009, though this number rose to 70 by 2014. By the latter year eight Argentine firms are mentioned as GRI Organizational Stakeholders, with only one company, Banco Galicia, being of relevant size (GRI, 2014a). 
This landscape is particularly distinct for the Brazilian case, where a significant number of national industrial champions – some of them very large mixed-capital firms – have been involved in both the GRI and other sustainability initiatives. In the case of GRI alone, this involves companies of the size of Petrobras, Vale, Natura, Bradesco, Samarco, Banco do Brasil, Itaú Bank, Itaipú Binational, and the São Paulo stock exchange BOVESPA, as organizational stakeholders. One of GRI’s Board Directors, Roberto Waack, is CEO of the Brazilian forestry company AMATA and sits in the board of the FSC. Petrobras’ CEO occupies a place in the Board of the UNGC, and a Petrobras executive attended as the Brazilian business expert to ISO SR, a position previously occupied by a representative of Natura, the personal care giant. Similarly active has been the presence of civil society organizations. This is led by the Ethos Institute of Enterprise Responsibility, whose Executive Director sits in the governing board of the UNGC, hosted the first GRI’s national office until 2010, attended ISO SR, and has an extensive presence and contacts with local business and civil society, and with international standard-setters.​[12]​ Sustainability projects also involve relevant civil society organizations such as IBASE, a leading think tank that run a recognized social reporting standard until 2008, the prestigious FGV university, the Brazilian Association of NGOs (ABONG), the Brazilian Institute of Corporate Governance (IBGC), which organizes the Directors of Brazilian firms and hosts the GRI office since 2010, and the Akatu Institute for Responsible Consumption, an Ethos-sister organization who provided the expert representing Brazilian civil society in ISO SR and has links with SAI, UNEP and the World Economic Forum (Author Year, Grajew 2010).   
This section not only confirms that the pattern of engagement of Argentine actors differs dramatically from the pattern in Brazil, but also delineates several features suggesting low resonance, such as the absence of actors of institutional weight and limited cross-sectoral links. The next section discusses these features in light of the dissonance of certain national political cultural elements with core programmatic aspects behind sustainability governance, in areas such as environmental protection, human rights, labor standards, and business-led regulation. 

4.	Framing Sustainability: Politics, Antagonism, and Distrust





The consolidation of transnational sustainability governance in the 2000s coincided in Argentina with the arrival to power a post-crisis administration that rejected neoliberal policies and pro-market discourses. Since 2003, President Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and later his wife, President Cristina Fernández (2007-2015), successfully advanced a neo-developmental model based on a left-wing Peronist ‘rhetoric that recalls the welfare state and the import substitution era of the 1940s yet remains committed in important respects to open markets and export-led growth’ (Riggirozzi, 2009, p. 89).​[13]​ A central pillar of this model was reaffirming the position of the state, eroded under the neoliberal Menem administrations in the 1990s, as core regulator of economic activity and central intermediary in collective relations (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007). 
A consequence of this approach was the exclusive politicization of a number of social spheres relevant to sustainability governance along the lines of the governmental rhetoric. This further restricted key regulatory areas, such as human and labor rights, as a valid competency of private regulation. In Argentina, human rights were already a sensitive issue that reverberated with the traumatic experience of the crimes committed during the last military dictatorship (1976-1983) (Jelin, 1994). The campaign for the prosecution of those involved in state terrorism brought the Argentine human rights movement international recognition, but the issue remained problematic in light of pardon laws passed in the 1990s (Peruzzotti, 2001; Sikkink, 2008). However, since 2003 the Kirchner government pursued an active ‘politics of memory’ agenda, pushing forward significant transitional justice measures and progressive policies. This gained the government the strong backing of important sectors of local civil society, and facilitated the co-optation of leading civil society representatives into its political project, as it happened with some leaders of the influential Madres de Playa de Mayo group (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008). In the process, the discourse and agenda of human rights became increasingly articulated with the Peronist-nationalist rhetoric emanating from the government, resulting in a situation where ‘the imprint of human rights discourse is not only present in public demonstrations and protests, politicians’ speeches, and cultural productions but [is] part of urban landscape’ (Sutton, 2015, p. 83). This accentuated an endogamous framing of human rights matters that limited the reach of alternative advocacy agendas. As Engstrom (2013, p. 136) notes, ‘the association of the vocabulary of human rights with military abuses of the past has often made it difficult to mobilize the human rights discourse around pressing contemporary challenges’. 
The detrimental effect of the politicization of human rights in relation to sustainability was underlined by Jorge Taillant, the Director of CEHDA, the only Argentine NGO with a senior consultative role in one of the global initiatives. Since its foundation in 1999, CEHDA promoted legal reforms aimed at regulating the human rights responsibilities of firms, and at complementing environmental and human rights law. By 2011 however, Taillant acknowledged that linking human rights with corporate governance was ‘an impossible task’ in Argentina, due to the level and type of politicization of the issue, and the resistance that a private governance approach generated not only among government officials but also in civil society and academic circles (CEDHA, 2011, pers. comm., 14 September). This led his organization to abandon this strategy, aimed at influencing Argentine actors and laws, and to focus on shaping international regulatory frameworks, in particular the conditions attached to IFC loans for developing countries. 
Simultaneously, this framing was noticed to limit the reach of human rights in private regulation in Argentina to issues of workplace rights and entitlements (Newell and Muro, 2006, p. 62). However, this poses a second challenge for the sustainability frame as it conflicts with a lasting neo-corporatist approach in Argentine industrial relations, in particular under Peronist governments (Romero, 2002). Argentina is a country historically characterized by an asymmetric industrial relations system, where a highly centralized labor movement, presided by the CGT union confederation – with strong ideological and institutional links with Peronist parties such as the Kirchners’ – faces weak and fragmented industry federations (Ross Schneider, 2004). Moreover, since its arrival the Kirchner government supported the reconsolidation of labor power, reversing labor flexibilisation laws, endorsing trade unions during wage negotiations, and consolidating the authority of the CGT as the only trade union organization legally entitled to engage in collective bargaining at the national level (Etchemendy and Collier, 2007). 
This neo-corporatist matrix permeates the manner in which private governance projects are approached by both the government and labor. Sustainability governance is largely a competence of the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, which in 2006 opened a Coordinating Office on CSR and Decent Work. There is also a Sub-secretary of Promotion of Sustainable Development, under the Secretary of Environment. However, its main program, titled ‘Labor and Sustainable Development’, has the CGT as a central partner and is sponsored by the labor ministry and the ILO (SADS, 2012). Relevantly, a recent publication by the Labor ministry, and in particular its prologue written by Minister Carlos Tomada, provides direct insight to the government’s position. In the document, private governance is referenced exclusively in relation to international agreements such as the OECD’s Directives for Multinational Corporations and the ILO’s Declaration on Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, with no mention of other regulatory frameworks. Furthermore, the document questions the applicability of voluntary and private models of regulation to the Argentine context, considering that these issues are better approached from a labor rights perspective where the government, and not private regulators, retains a coordinating role (MdT, 2009). 
This corporatist position is stronger in the stance of Argentine trade unions, as revealed by the minutes of a regional workshop on ISO 26000 developments that took place in Brazil in 2009, organized by the Americas-wide labor confederation CSA-TUCA, and the International Trade Union Confederation, and a number of subsequent statements.​[14]​ These documents evidence a skeptical and oppositional attitude towards the development of a private social responsibility standard, openly questioning the need for a norm that is voluntary and set by a body that did not conform to ILO tripartism. In a following press release, the CGT denounced the entire ISO SR enterprise as invalid, and extended its rejection to any other initiative intending to privatize and ‘soften’ labor legislation and the legal responsibilities of business. Additionally, it called for other labor organizations and governments to boycott future initiatives, considering that participation weakened international tripartism and national industrial relations institutions. In a later note sent to the ISO SR labor committee, Argentine labor expressed discontent with the advance of the ISO 26000 process. The note ironically praised the ‘triumph’ of the business community in getting governments and workers’ representatives from diverse countries to participate in an initiative legitimizing a ‘[...] new space for the interpretation, shaping, and even the generation, of international social and labor norms’ that would ‘sterilize the ILO’. This note also questioned the ‘global’ character of the norm, and its applicability to the Latin American and Argentine context: in labor’s view, ISO failed to notice that business historically suffered from major ‘cultural deficits’ in the region, having supported in the past authoritarian regimes, lacking independence from the state, and displaying a tendency to be co-opted by foreign interests. Hence, private regulatory frameworks might work in Europe and the US, but were overly optimistic for Argentina.

2.	Environmental Indifference    
  
	The second political cultural condition affecting sustainability resonance in the country is the low political relevance of environmental concerns and regulation. Environmental matters have consistently been a tertiary priority for national governments, which since the 1990s have opposed the implementation of international environmental regimes and conventions (Hochstetler, 2002, p. 43). This is a key difference with the case of Brazil and other countries in the region, where environmental cleavages have come to occupy a central position in political debates, ascribing to issues of ethnic politics, natural resources, and rural reform (Viola, 2013). Instead, in Argentina, as Reboratti (2012, p. 5) recently concluded, ‘the diffusion of environmental issues is so limited that there is scarce interest in the topic of the development of natural resources, or of the environmental impacts that this might entail’. The country lacks a Green Party of any significance, nor does it count with influential environmental social movements capable of turning environmental matters into an electoral or public opinion concern, with the most active environmental agents being community-level movements with minimal institutionalization and few contacts with organized civil society, academia, or political parties (Espach, 2009, p. 106). Accordingly, environmental regulatory institutions are poorly developed, and regulatory tasks are left in the hands of weaker provincial authorities. This has contributed to a dysfunctional regulatory system – described by Amengual (2013) as ‘chaotic’ – characterized by the lack of clear institutional responsibilities, enforcement capabilities, and plagued by corruption.​[15]​ As a result ‘Argentine environmental institutions have never functioned in the way that any major group would support’ (Amengual, 2013, p. 532).   
	Moreover, as noted by Newell (2009, p. 275-276), in Argentina technologies and industries capable of exploiting natural resources, such as genetically modified (GM) crops, have been historically covered by a hegemonic discourse that frames these activities as ‘economically significant, socially beneficial, safe, and environmentally benign’. This is a discourse reproduced by actors in different sectors and levels – small and large producers, rural communities, governments of different political extraction, and the media – as well as by firms operating in the sector. This is not surprising in a country (and region) where developmental trajectories remain heavily reliant on exporting agricultural commodities and other primary products, and where the countryside is amply seen as the main national economic endowment.
This stance experienced minimal changes in the 2000s.​[16]​ The Kirchner administrations, as many of its regional counterparts, have been tacitly supportive of an extractivist model where agribusiness, oil, biofuel production, forestry, and mining are considered priority industries, capable of generating important hard-currency revenues to be used for developmental and redistributive goals (Svampa and Sola Alvarez, 2010). In spite of its rhetoric, Kirchner administrations maintained an ambivalent position in relation to agribusiness and extractive industries, stalling or not implementing legislation that could jeopardize private investment, such as environmental impact assessment laws and laws for protection of glaciers and water supplies (Gutierrez and Isuani, 2013). Accordingly, all environmental NGOs interviewed expressed critical views of the government’s environmental policy. 
This policy approach triggered a new round of localized social conflict between authorities, firms, and civil society groups, in particular in poorer provinces aspiring to capture benefits from mining or agricultural investment. These conflicts were noted to share a pattern where grassroots and civil society organizations oppose corporate projects, provincial governments accuse these groups of irresponsibility and hampering investment, the national government remains indifferent or silent, and companies roll out CSR and community development activities to garner public support and comply with organizational policies (Espach, 2006; García-López and Arizpe, 2010, p. 202). Not surprisingly, in the last five years GRI sustainability reports in Argentina surged, with agribusiness, mining, and energy companies accounting for an important proportion of the total number of reports submitted in the country (GRI, 2015). At the same time, analysts have consistently indicated that Argentine environmental groups and movements perceive CSR and sustainability initiatives as a ‘greenwash’ aimed at foreign audiences and at buying public support, and generally refuse to cooperate with firms over these issues (Mutti et al., 2012; Reboratti, 2012; Svampa and Sola Alvarez, 2010). 

3.	Business in Society 

The third element, a widespread and enduring suspicion about the role of business in society, connects with the previous two points and sustains an antagonistic pattern of relations that negatively affects the legitimacy of private regulatory regimes in general. This negative positioning of business links with an established ideological narrative where both domestic business elites and foreign corporations are considered partly responsible for the failed industrialization of the country. This narrative strengthened during the opening and ‘modernization’ phase of the economy, given the negative consequences the process had for Argentine business culture, as it involved the disappearance of recognized state-owned industries and national industrial champions – many of which were acquired by foreign firms – and the ensuing weakening of the national industrial class (Gaggero, 2012; Schvarzer, 1996).​[17]​ By late 1990s, Jorge Schvarzer (1998, p. 154), a recognized scholar of Argentine industry, observed that ‘in the social imaginary, local industry became a scapegoat for Argentine problems’, associated with low quality products, lacking national identity, and only capable of thriving under rentier practices.​[18]​ 
Again, this narrative was amplified by the statist anti-neoliberal discourse emanating from the government since the early 2000s: the Kirchner administrations resorted to an explicitly anti-corporate discourse that framed the Argentine business class – and in particular traditional groups such as the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA) and the Argentine Rural Society (grouping large rural producers and land-owning elites) – of being complicit with foreign interests and opposed to national developmental policies. In particular, the government articulated a frame that connected business interests, the oppressive policies of the authoritarian period, and the disastrous results of neoliberal economics in the country.​[19]​ This rhetoric was further stepped up after the rural conflict of 2008, triggered by a governmental attempt to raise taxes on key agricultural exports, mainly soy (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008; Richardson, 2009). Contributing to the polarization of society into pro- and anti-government camps, these protests exposed certain sectors of business such as firms in wage-good areas and agribusinesses, to a new round of public criticism and scrutiny by the government, trade unions, and aligned sectors of civil society (Etchemendy and Garay, 2011). 
The effect of this political framing pervades the position of multiple domestic actors in relation to sustainability initiatives. In the view of the Director of an international sustainability NGO operating in the country, with the exclusion of some TNCs and their subsidiaries, Argentine firms have little incentive to innovate in relation to socially-oriented programs, as they consider that the risk of greater public exposure is ‘just not worth it’ (Avina, 2011, pers. comm., 5 September). Similarly, civil society organizations also reported prejudices against working on corporate-oriented projects, as partnerships with business are not considered ‘serious work’, and are treated with suspicion by the broader civil society community and state officials (CEDHA, 2011, pers. comm., 14 September; IARSE, 2011, pers. comm., 13 September; Avina, 2011, pers. comm., 5 September). Not surprisingly, local initiatives seeking to articulate business and civil society collaboration have historically had limited impact and life, as it happened with the Social Sector Forum, created in 1996, and the ‘Argentine Platform of Civil Society Organizations for CSR’, launched in 2004 to coordinate a civil society-wide position on sustainability matters, but dissolved in 2007.
Interestingly, and pointing to the open and dynamic nature of framing processes, in recent years some local business actors have resorted to sustainability frames and initiatives as an defensive strategy against anti-corporate discourses and corporatist practices. This is the case, for example, of a semi-formal network of Buenos Aires city businessmen called ‘Nuevos Aires’, set up in 2009 to promote corporate citizenship in Argentine business culture. Its founder, Alan Gegenschatz, relies on ideas of sustainability and human development to criticize the ‘petty mentality’ of the Argentine business class and the prevalence of clouded corporatist and clientelist relations in Argentine industrial culture (NuevosAires, 2013). A defensive use is also found in the involvement of the agribusiness group Los Grobo – heavily targeted during the rural protests – in the RTRS, a global initiative launched in 2005 (RTRS, 2013). A Los Grobo executive involved in the RTRS Board indicated that, in addition to new market requirements, their participation very much considered the importance of enhancing their legitimacy given the negative public exposure their firm and industry had experienced since 2008 (Los Grobo, 2011, pers. comm., 13 September). Los Grobo joined the RTRS in 2009, obtained its first certificate in 2011, and until recently chaired the RTRS presidency. 




The article has argued that over the decade Argentine political culture has (i) configured an exclusive discursive field around sustainability initiatives and their promoters, that (ii) precluded wider norm-diffusion and regime uptake by limiting the interest of potential adherents and collaborators. Sustainability initiatives tend to be framed as corporate projects of limited social and political relevance, disconnected from national positions concerning domestic priorities, human and labor rights, and corporate practices. As a result, in the words of a local interviewee, ‘private social responsibility is not an issue in the public eye in Argentina’ (San Andrés University, 2011, pers. comm., 14 September). The ‘shallow’ salience of sustainability frames and programs in the country is conducive to a pattern of engagement featuring a disarticulated network of actors, peripheral NGOs, and proxy organizations. 
Acknowledging the limitations of case studies for theory-building, the article poses that national cultural-ideological structures may be more resilient and influential than what conventional models imply, configuring discursive fields that can be either supportive or detrimental for the operation of global norms and actors. Moreover, the case suggests that some national political cultures may be more compatible and receptive than others in relation to sustainability norms, and that such compatibility constitutes a necessary condition for successful norm diffusion and regime effectiveness upon implementation. When semantically aligned with incoming regulatory frames, national cultural structures and institutions provide fertile symbolic material for the emergence and evolution of (second order) legitimacy-building processes and coordination games that underpin organizational capacity.​[20]​ Instead, when this alignment is absent, as in the Argentine case, it becomes difficult for norm-entrepreneurs and interested parties to make sense and establish meaningful communications and relations with other potential participants and allies. This interferes with the normative validity of prospective norms, amplifies competing counterframes and antagonistic positions, and deters the emergence of supporting coalitions. In this manner, the article validates the observation by Espach (2009, p. 141) that ‘effective regime implementation may be impossible’ in certain national environments, as it involves altering enduring patterns of social relations beyond the reach of design considerations, and of framing strategies. Future research could examine and validate this conclusion, considering different frames and standards, cultural environments, regime moments, and political economic trajectories. 
Moreover, the article warns against accounts exclusively driven by market or power-centered considerations, and overly focused on developments in the global North. As shown, the domestic – and the domestic in the global South – emerges not as a passive context of deficit, but as a dynamic field populated by active structures, institutions, and actors. Furthermore, the case suggests that situated political actors may be better positioned to devise ‘counterframes’ that reverberate nationally, and that can potentially ‘crowd out’ new regulatory models and norms. This is clear in the case of the Kirchner governments, which over the last decade successfully promoted a political discourse that amplified certain cultural-political narratives in detriment of private governance frames and initiatives. In the context of Latin America, and of the global South in general, the historical and enduring centrality of the role of the state – not only institutionally, but also ideologically as well as discursively – remains a key variable to be considered when analyzing private governance and its diffusion, even if governmental actors are rarely found to be directly involved. Simultaneously, the case showed that low resonance does not imply that sustainability initiatives will fail to recruit relevant participants. An adversarial environment can even reinforce self-regulation as a defensive practice, as it appears to be the case with the RTRS and GRI. In this form, rationalist and cultural explanations might not be mutually exclusive and in certain instances could well complement each other, but nonetheless involve different understandings of what regime effectiveness entails and how participation is sustained.​[21]​ 
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^1	  Argentina, with Brazil and the US, is one of the leading soy exporters in the world, with 70% of its domestic production controlled by 3% of the producers (García-López and Arizpe, 2010, p. 199).
^2	  Quantitative studies identify regime participation to positively correlate with a multiplicity of variables, from export orientation, to subscription to ILO conventions, freedom of press, civil society capacity, treaty participation, and/or domestic regulation and the rule-of-law (Berliner and Prakash, 2012; Toffel et al., 2015).
^3	  For example, in Brazil he misses the role of ideological affinities and collaborative links established in the democratization period between corporate promoters of CSR and influential political and civil society figures (Peña and Davies, 2014).
^4	  Among these processes, ‘frame amplification’ involves the idealization, clarification or invigoration of existing values and beliefs, while ‘frame extension’ entails reaching beyond the primary interests of norm-setters to include issues and concerns presumed to be of importance for the audience.
^5	  This can be particularly so in the context of the global South, as Southern actors can be expected to draw from political-cultural references that differ from those in the Northern supply side.  
^6	  The UNGC states as its objective to align the operation and strategies of business with ‘ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labor, environment and anti-corruption’ (UNGC, 2014), the GRI’s mission is ‘to make sustainability reporting a standard practice for all companies and organizations’ (GRI, 2014b), and the ISO 26000 norm provides ‘guidelines to all types of organizations, regardless of their size or location’ on concepts, principles, and practices of social responsibility (ISO, 2014a, p. 1). Furthermore, since 2010 the three initiatives have increasingly reference to each other as compatible and complementary, publishing joint guidelines (ISO, 2014b; UNGC, 2010). 
^7	  The Argentine Ministry of Finance appears as a GRI’s Organizational Stakeholder since 2014.
^8	  For example, a high executive of the Techint Group could not explain what participation in the UNGC entailed (Techint/UIA, 2011, pers. comm., 8 September). Relevantly, a 2005 study on business lobby in Argentina concluded that early signatories of the UNGC did so for marketing purposes, with no intention of effective application (Pfeiffer, 2006, p. 75). 
^9	  The IAPG executive occupying this position explained that there was no ‘agenda’ per se in the national network beyond compliance with UNGC guidelines, and that coordination activities were minimal (IAPG, 2011, pers. comm., 6 September).
^10	  CEADS is the Argentine chapter of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD).
^11	  Surprisingly, the last CEADS progress report – covering the 1998-2007 period – did not made a single reference to private sustainability initiatives (CEADS, 2008).
^12	  Already by 2004, Ethos member companies were claimed to represent about of a third of the Brazilian GDP (Young, 2004). 
^13	  Riggirozzi (2009) refers to this model as ‘open economy nationalism’ while Richardson (2009) opts for ‘export-oriented populism’.
^14	  Documents available in CSA (2011). 
^15	  Former Minister Romina Picolotti is currently under trial accused of malversation of public funds.
^16	  The conflict about the pulp mills on the Uruguay River (2005-2010) constitutes perhaps the main exception of an environmental question that became a (temporary) salient political concern, though this was also framed along the nationalist lines of the governmental discourse (Waisbord and Peruzzotti, 2009).  
^17	  The Menem administration lowered average tariffs from 26% to 10%, sending many local firms to bankruptcy and/or to foreign hands. This contributed to the fragmentation of business representation, further reducing the institutional strength of the sector (Ross Schneider, 2004, p. 195).
^18	  This view was evident in the criticism by Argentine unions to the ISO 26000 norm.
^19	  This vision was clearly outlined in one of the first speeches by President Kirchner upon winning the presidency, where he stated his intention to discriminate from politics the ‘destroyers of the Nation’: the military, the Catholic Church, and business (Barbosa, 2010, p. 29).
^20	  This is registered to take place in Brazil, where environmentalism, CSR, and sustainability issues reverberate with broader social and political agendas, recently motivating the emergence of a ‘Sustainability Party’ (Author, Year).
^21	  See the point by Espach (2009, p. 32).  
